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CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY V JONES: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BLANKET PRIMARY LAWS*
AIMEE DUDOVITZ
If a party cannot make nominations it ceases to be a party... he
who can make the nominations is the owner of the party.
E.E. Shattschneider'
Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if asso-
ciations could not limit control over their decisions to those who




Primary elections present both courts and scholars with an unusual
legal challenge. To many, primaries appear to be a government function.
The United States Constitution grants states the power to proscribe the
"Times, Places, and Manner" of elections,3 and most states have enacted
laws that regulate the conduct of primary elections. In actuality, how-
ever, primary elections are party-driven activities. Political parties use
primaries as a vehicle for selecting a candidate to represent the party in
the general election. Primary elections also allow political parties to
. This article was accepted for publication in late 1999. Since that time, the Su-
preme Court declared California's blanket primary law unconstitutional. See California
Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000). The Court has not directly addressed,
however, the many issues raised by the author herein.
1. E.E. SHATrSCHNEIDER, PARTY GovERNMENT (1942).
2. LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CoNsTTUTioNAL LAW 1014 (2d ed. 1988).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.L
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compromise and reach consensus regarding their own associational
goals.
Because primary elections play a central role in defining a party's
political purpose and ideals, state control over participation in primaries
may profoundly influence, not just a party's choice of candidates, but
also the content of a party's political speech.5 Thus, any state regulation
of participation in primaries necessarily implicates a party's First
Amendment right to freedom of association. Yet, few would question
the need for some form of government oversight. Government regula-
tion ensures that the election process is fair and impartial, and is there-
fore both constitutionally permissible and desirable.
It is the tension between these two constitutional interests that is at
the forefront of the debate over the constitutionality of state-mandated
blanket primary laws.6 Washington, Alaska, Louisiana,7 and most re-
cently, California,8 have all enacted so-called "blanket primary" laws. A
4. See Julia E. Guttman, Note, Primary Elections and the Collective Right of Free-
dom of Association, 94 YALE L.J. 117, 125-26 (1984) (discussing critical role of prima-
ries in defining political parties). As Guttman explains, "[s]ince control over participation
in primary elections can profoundly influence the content of the compromise emerging
from the primary election, a political party's ability to define its boundaries cannot be
separated from the party's ability to determine its political ideology." Id. at 126.
5. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 216 (1986) (discuss-
ing state election laws as burdening parties' right to freedom of association); TRIBE, su-
pra note 2, at 1112 (stating that "[a]ny state law that circumscribes the discretion of a
political party infringes associational interests.").
6. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (E.D. Cal,
1997) (stating that "[i]t is the clash of these two constitutionally rooted interests that must
be resolved in this case."). Moreover, according to Professor Daniel Lowenstein, because
the relationship between the state and the parties is truly unique, their relationship is dis-
tinct from any other problem in constitutional law. See Daniel Hayes Lowenstein, Asso-
ciational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV 1714,
1744 (1993) (discussing nature of conflict between states and parties).
7. Although Louisiana technically utilizes a kind of blanket primary, their system
is unlike that of the other three blanket primary states. See California Democratic Party,
984 F. Supp. at 1292. Under the Louisiana system, all candidates participate in a nonpar-
tisan open primary. See id. The two candidates who receive the most votes then meet in a
runoff or general election. See id. Importantly, the two candidates who receive the most
votes are selected without regard to party affiliation. See id.
8. The California initiative that instituted the current blanket primary system was
labeled an open primary initiative. However, as Judge Levi explained in his opinion
upholding the proposition, California's system is more appropriately characterized as a
blanket primary. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1291-92. According
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blanket primary allows all voters, regardless of their party affiliation, to
vote for any candidate for each political office.9 For example, a voter
who is registered as a Republican may vote for a Democrat for President,
a Republican for Senate, and a minor party candidate for the House of
Representatives.
Although increasing a voter's choices on election day is a laudable
goal, this Article asserts that state-mandated blanket primaries violate the
parties' First Amendment right to freedom of association and are there-
fore unconstitutional. Although the conclusion that state-mandated blan-
ket primaries are unconstitutional is compelled by Supreme Court prece-
dent, it also raises a number of potential difficulties. First, there are
many scholars who suggest that the notion that state-mandated blanket
primaries are unconstitutional is inconsistent with the White Primary
Cases, which held that parties cannot discriminate on the basis of race in
elections, because in the election context, political parties are state ac-
tors.10 These scholars suggest that political parties cannot be state actors
in the equal protection context of the White Primary Cases, and at the
same time, demand the First Amendment protections afforded a private
association.11
The second difficulty raised by the notion that state-mandated blan-
ket primaries are unconstitutional is the effect of such a holding upon
government regulation of primaries more generally. This Article asserts
that Supreme Court precedent supports the notion that state-mandated
blanket primaries are unconstitutional. However, that same precedent
arguably supports the conclusion that all state-mandated primary struc-
to Judge Levi, the blanket primary is one kind of open primary-one kind of system that
does not limit voters to the party with which they are affiliated. See id.
9. In the debate over California's blanket primary initiative, Judge Levi defined a
blanket primary as an election in which "the voter is not limited to the ballot of any single
party." California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1291. In contrast, the Democratic
Party, which opposes the blanket primary, chose to explain the law as one which "forces
the parties to open their partisan primaries to unaffiliated voters and to voters with ad-
verse political interests." Appellants Reply Brief at 1, California Democratic Party (No.
97-17440).
10. See Paul Carman, Comment, Cousins and La Follette: An Anomaly Created by
a Choice Between Freedom of Association and the Right to Vote, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 666,
668-69 (1985) (discussing White Primary Cases and potential conflict with those cases
that discuss political parties' rights to freedom of association).
11. Id. (discussing potential conflict between the two lines of authority); see also
Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1747-53 (discussing potential conflict between two lines of
authority).
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tures are unconstitutional. In other words, a faithful reading of Supreme
Court precedent suggests that only the parties themselves can constitu-
tionally decide who may participate in primary elections. Thus, only a
primary system selected by the parties would pass constitutional muster.
This second difficulty provides the foundation for the third and final
issue raised by the notion that state-mandated blanket primaries are un-
constitutional. If the only constitutional primary structure is one selected
or ratified by the parties themselves, courts must then confront the issue
of who speaks for the party-what voices must be heard before a court
may conclude that "the party" has spoken? For example, if the Chairper-
son of the statewide Democratic party decides that the Democratic party
supports a blanket primary, is it appropriate for a court to find that "the
party" supports a blanket primary? Similarly, if ninety-five percent of all
registered Democrats voted in favor of a state ballot initiative that man-
dates a blanket primary, does "the party" support the initiative?
This Article asserts that although the conflict with the White Primary
Cases is more apparent than real, the remaining two issues raised by the
notion that blanket primary laws are unconstitutional cannot be as easily
dismissed. Section I of this Article begins by explaining the various
primary election systems and the standard of review that applies to First
Amendment challenges to state election regulations. Section II argues
that the Supreme Court should find state-mandated blanket primary laws
unconstitutional because of the severe burden they place on a party's
right to freedom of association. Finally, Section III explores three im-
portant questions that the Supreme Court may be compelled to address if
it reaches this conclusion: (1) can a party's claim for privacy and auton-
omy in the context of the First Amendment be reconciled with the notion
that political parties are agents of the state in the context of the White
Primary Cases; (2) does a decision to hold state-mandated blanket pri-
mary laws unconstitutional require courts to find that all state-mandated
primary systems are unconstitutional; and (3) who must speak before a
court may conclude that "the party" has spoken? This Article concludes
by suggesting that although the first of these three questions can be an-
swered with ease, the latter two present courts and scholars with unique
legal challenges.
II. BACKGROUND
An understanding of the various primary systems and the standard of
review that the Supreme Court applies to state election regulations pro-
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vides the backdrop for the debate about the constitutionality of blanket
primary laws. All states have an open, closed, or blanket primary, or
some variation thereof.12 Part A will set forth each of these three systems
and how they differ from one another. Part B will discuss the standard of
review which the Supreme Court applies in the context of First Amend-
ment challenges to state election regulations.
A. The Three Primary Election Systems
The blanket primary is only one of three basic systems of primary
elections. One of the most common systems is the open primary, which
allows registered voters to request a ballot for any party's primary on
election day, regardless of whether the voter has previously registered
with the party.13 Under an open primary system, however, the voter is
only permitted to participate in one party's primary.1 4 For example, a
registered Democrat may decide on election day to request the primary
ballot for the Republican party. Once this voter has requested the Re-
publican ballot, the voter will be unable to vote for a Democrat or inde-
pendent candidate in any of the primary races on that day. As of 1997,
twenty-one states employ open primary systems.15
In contrast to an open primary, a closed primary system restricts par-
ticipation in a party's primary to those voters who have registered as
members of the party.' Thus, under a traditional closed primary system,
only a voter who checked the "Democrat" box on his or her voter regis-
tration form is permitted to vote in the Democratic primary. Voters who
registered with other parties or declined to state a party affiliation will
12. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1291-92 (explaining three
primary systems); see also Brian M. Castro, Note, Smothering Freedom of Association:
The Alaska Supreme Court Errs in Upholding the State's Blanket Primary Statute, 14
Alaska L. Rev. 523, 524-25 (1997) (discussing three primary systems).
13. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1291.
14. See id.
15. See id. As Judge Levi explained in a footnote in California Democratic Party,
some political scientists define an open primary more narrowly. See id. at 1292 n.9.
These scientists argue that an open primary includes only those systems that do not re-
quire a voter to publicly declare their party affiliation. See id. There are only 10 states
that have such a system. The other 11 states allow voters to request the ballot of any
political party, but some record of each voter's request is made, thus requiring some
statement of affiliation for the record. See id.
16. See id. at 1291.
2000]
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not be able to vote for Democratic candidates on election day.17 Fifteen
states currently have closed primary systems. 18
In addition to the fifteen closed primary states, eight other states em-
ploy a variant of the closed primary which is often referred to as a "semi-
closed primary."19 Unlike the traditional closed primary, the semi-closed
system allows both registered members of the party and independent vot-
ers to participate in the party's election.20 Thus, under a semi-closed pri-
mary, the voter who checked "decline to state" on her voter registration
form in the example above would be permitted to participate in the
Democratic party primary.
Finally, four states currently use a blanket primary system.2 1 The
blanket primary allows all voters, regardless of their party affiliation, to
vote for any candidate in any election.22 Unlike a closed primary, the
voter need not register with a party to vote in that party's primary. Yet
unlike an open primary, where a voter can only vote in one party's pri-
mary, a voter may choose to vote in the Republican party primary for
President, and the Democratic party primary for State Assembly.
Alaska, Louisiana, Washington, and most recently, California, are the
only states that utilize any variation of the blanket primary.
23
B. Standard of Review: The Anderson Test
The modem standard of review for First Amendment challenges to
state election regulations was first set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze,24 a
1983 Supreme Court case involving a constitutional challenge to Ohio's
early filing deadline for independent candidates. 25 Anderson was an in-
dependent candidate for President in the 1980 general election who was
denied a place on the Ohio ballot because he failed to comply with the







23. See id.; see also Castro, supra note 12, at 525.
24. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
25. See id. at 782.
26. See id.
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his supporters challenged the law as an unconstitutional burden on their
First Amendment right to freedom of association.27
The Supreme Court held that the Ohio law was unconstitutional. 28 In
so holding, the Court applied what has come to be known as the Ander-
son test.29 Under the Anderson test, a court must first consider the "char-
acter and magnitude" of the burden that the state law imposes on a
party's First Amendment rights.30 Second, a court must "identify and
evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for
the burden imposed by its rule.",3' Finally, a court must weigh the State's
asserted interest against the burden the regulation imposes on a party's
constitutional rights.32
The Anderson balancing test is fairly malleable.3 3 Its application de-
pends largely on how a court construes the burden that a regulation
places on a party's First Amendment rights. If the court finds that a state
law imposes a severe burden, the state regulation must survive strict
scrutiny.34 In contrast, if the regulation imposes a burden on the party
that is less than severe, a State's "important regulatory interest" will suf-
fice.
35
The Anderson Court found that Ohio's early filing deadline placed a
"particular burden" on the rights of independent voters. 36 The Court re-
jected the State's various attempts to justify the burden imposed by the
regulation and found that Ohio had only a "minimal interest" in the filing
deadline provision.37 Weighing the interests of the voters against the in-
terests of the State, the Court concluded that the Ohio statute placed an
27. See id. at 783.
28. See id. at 806.
29. Castro, supra note 12, at 532 (referring to "the Anderson test").
30. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1108 (discussing the Anderson test). Tribe charac-
terizes the Anderson test as more "open-ended" than the Court's traditional "two-tiered
equal protection analysis." Id. Tribe argues that the Anderson decision "perpetuated"
rather than settled the confusion regarding the level of scrutiny that courts should apply in
First Amendment challenges to state election regulations. Id.
34. See California Democratic Party 984 F. Supp. at 1294.
35. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,358 (1997).
36. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at792.
37. See id. at 806; see also Tribe, supra note 2, at 1109 (discussing Anderson).
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unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of Ander-
38son's supporters.
Since 1983, courts have applied the Anderson test to decide the con-
stitutionality of state election regulations that burden a party's First
Amendment rights.3 9 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its com-
mitment to the Anderson test in 1997 in the case of Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party.40 In a six to three decision, the Timmons Court
used the Anderson test to uphold a Minnesota election law which pro-
hibited candidates from appearing on the ballot as a candidate for more
than one party.4' One of the central issues of contention between the
Timmons majority and the dissent was the proper application of the An-
derson test. Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that the majority mis-
takenly concluded that the Minnesota law at issue placed an "unimpor-
tant" burden on the party's First Amendment rights.42 Because the Court
found that the law imposed a minimal burden, the Court applied a fairly
deferential standard of review.43
However, in his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should
have applied strict scrutiny because the law placed a severe burden on
the party's rights.44 In addition, according to Justice Stevens, The Tim-
mons majority failed to assure that the "State's asserted interests ...
[actually] bear some plausible relationship to the burdens it places on
political parties."45 Stevens suggested that the Timmons majority simply
accepted Minnesota's assertion that the law furthered the state's inter-
est.4 Instead, Stevens argued that the Court should have required some-
thing more before it was willing to uphold a law that burdened a party's
right to freedom of association.47
Although the majority and the dissent disagreed on its application,
the Timmons Court reaffirmed the importance of the Anderson test in
38. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806.
39. See, e.g., Timmons, 520 U.S. at 369 (applying Anderson test); Tashjian, 479
U.S. at 213-14 (applying Anderson test).
40. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 369-70.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1377 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 1372.
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First Amendment challenges to state election regulations. Accordingly,
any First Amendment challenge to a state-mandated blanket primary
must contend with the Anderson test. As Timmons illustrates, the result
of such a challenge will depend in large part on the way the Supreme
Court applies the Anderson test and the extent to which the Court scruti-
nizes the state's asserted interest in the law. As Section II of this Article
will demonstrate, the Anderson test suggests that the Supreme Court
should find state-mandated blanket primary laws unconstitutional.
H. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE-MANDATED
BLANKET PRIMARY LAWS
As set forth above, the Supreme Court should apply the Anderson
test in evaluating the constitutionality of California's blanket primary
law. Accordingly, Part A will address the first part of the Anderson test
and assess the "character and magnitude" of a party's First Amendment
interests burdened by the regulation.a Part B will address the second part
of the Anderson test, which requires the Court to consider the state's as-
serted interest in a blanket primary law.49 Finally, Part C will balance the
interests of the parties against those of the state, and conclude by arguing
that under the Anderson test, state-mandated blanket primary laws un-
constitutionally burden a party's right to freedom of association.
A. Burden on a Party's First Amendment Right to
Freedom of Association
The right to freedom of association was recognized as one of the
fundamental guarantees of the First Amendment in NAACP v. Ala-
bama.50 In NAACP, the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance an
association can play in supporting and furthering the First Amendment
activities of its members. 51 The Court expressly extended the right to
freedom of association to political parties in both Kusper v. Pontikes
52
and Cousins v. Wigoda.53 As the Court explained in Kusper:
48. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (setting forth Anderson test).
49. See id.
50. See 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958).
51. See id. at 462-63.
52. See 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973).
53. See 419 U.S. 477,487 (1975).
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There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with
others for the advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a
form of orderly group activity protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.... The right to associate with the political
party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitu-
tional freedom.54
Moreover, as the Court noted in Cousins, "[a]ny interference with the
freedom of a party is simultaneously interference with the freedom of its
adherents. 55
Thus, freedom of association guarantees political parties the right to
associate for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs. Yet, as the Su-
preme Court stated in Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, this freedom "nec-
essarily presupposes the freedom [of the party] to identify the people
who constitute the association, and to limit the association to those peo-
ple only.' 56 Selecting a candidate to represent the party in a general elec-
tion is one of the central ways that political parties advance their shared
beliefs.5 7 By facilitating the party's selection of a standard bearer, pri-
mary elections serve as a vehicle through which political parties are able
to compromise and reach consensus regarding their own associational
goals.58 Accordingly, state control over participation in primaries may
profoundly influence not just the party's choice of candidates, but also
the content of the party's political speech.59 As one author explained, "a
political party's ability to define its boundaries cannot be separated from
the party's ability to determine its political ideology."
60
The Supreme Court confirmed the importance of a party's right to
determine its own boundaries in Tashjian v. Republican Party.61 In
Tashjian, the Republican party argued that a Connecticut closed primary
law unconstitutionally infringed upon the party's right to freedom of as-
54. Kusper, 414 U.S. at 56-57.
55. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 487 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
250 (1957)).
56. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981).
57. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 122-25 (discussing role of primaries in creating
party ideology).
58. See id. at 125-26.
59. See id. at 126.
60. Id. at 126.
61. 479 U.S. at 214.
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sociation by limiting the group of registered voters that the party could
invite to participate in its primary.62 The Court agreed with the Republi-
can Party and struck down the closed primary law. As the Court ex-
plained, such a regulation "limits the Party's associational opportunities
at the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be
translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the
community., 6' Furthermore, although the Tashjian Court never expressly
defined the burden that the Connecticut regulation placed on the Repub-
lican party as severe, the Court implicitly accepted the severity of the
burden when it proceeded to apply strict scrutiny.
64
Connecticut advanced a number of interests in support of its state-
mandated closed primary system including administrative convenience
and savings, preventing voter raiding, preventing voter confusion, and
protecting the integrity of the two-party system.65 The Tashjian Court
found all of these asserted interests "insubstantial" and struck down the
law as unconstitutional.66
In contrast to the closed primary statute at issue in Tashjian, which
prohibited parties from inviting unaffiliated voters to participate in their67
primaries, a blanket primary requires parties to permit unaffiliated vot-
ers to participate in their primaries. 68 Nonetheless, Tashjian requires the
Court to also find a state-mandated blanket primary unconstitutional.69
62. Seeid. at211-13.
63. Id. at 216.
64. See id. at 217.
65. Id. at 217-25 (discussing various interests advanced by Connecticut in support
of closed primary statute).
66. See id. at 225.
67. See id. at 211-13 (explaining statute at issue in Tashjian).
68. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1290 (explaining Califor-
nia's blanket primary system).
69. But see id. at 1303 (distinguishing Tashjian from blanket primary law in Cali-
fornia). In California Democratic Party, Judge Levi sought to distinguish Tashjian based
on the different political contexts in which the two laws were adopted:
Unlike Tashjian in which the Democratic Party controlled the legis-
lature and attempted to tell the Republican Party who could vote in its
primary, and where the State's purported interest in a closed primary
was to protect the parties from disruption from without, Proposition
198 [the California blanket primary law] is a non-discriminatory
measure that was adopted by a clear majority of voters, with a con-
vincing margin from both major parties, and which advances interests
2000]
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Like the closed primary law at issue in Tashjian, blanket primary laws
prevent a party from defining its own boundaries. Whether state law re-
quires parties to include certain voters or prohibits parties from doing the
same, the state imposes a burden on the parties' associational rights.
Thus, state-mandated blanket primaries, like closed primaries, se-
verely burden a political party's First Amendment right to freedom of
association. As the Tashjian court explained, "[a]ny effort by the state to
substitute its judgment for that of the party on... who is and is not suffi-
ciently allied in interest with the party to warrant inclusion in its candi-
date selection process ... substantially impinges on First Amendment
rights."7' Because of this substantial burden, the Supreme Court should
apply strict scrutiny in evaluating the constitutionality of state-mandated
blanket primary laws.
that are uniquely those of the [S]tate and its electorate as opposed to
the parties. Id.
However, Judge Levi's attempt to distinguish Tashjian is not persuasive. Assuming
Judge Levi's statement regarding the support that Proposition 198 received from voters of
both major political parties is correct, Levi is essentially arguing that a blanket primary
system is permissible as long as the parties themselves approve of the system. In other
words, the difference between Tashjian and the situation in California Democratic Party
is that in the former, the statute at issue defined the Republican party's boundariesfor the
party, while in the latter, the parties (i.e. the voters affiliated with each party) defined
their own boundaries.
Here, Judge Levi is equating exit polls indicating support for the proposition by vot-
ers of both major parties with the notion that the parties themselves supported the propo-
sition, and thus defined their own boundaries. However, as Levi stated earlier in his
opinion, one cannot equate the results of exit polls with a formal decision by a political
party. See id. at 1294 n.16. And, if poll results cannot replace formal party decisions, then
it is not clear whether the political context of Tashjian was truly that different from the
political context of California Democratic Party.
70. In California Democratic Party, California argued for a narrower reading of
Tashjian. California argued that Tashjian stands for the proposition that the state cannot
limit who a party may include in their primary. Thus, a blanket primary law, which re-
quires parties to open their primaries to additional voters, would not be unconstitutional
under Tashjian. See Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 22-23, California Democratic
Party (No. CIV. S-96-02038 DFL). At best, this is a strained reading of Supreme Court
precedent. In order to conclude that Tashjian's holding was so limited, one must overlook
the many passages in Tashjian regarding the importance of a party's ability to determine
its own boundaries. Such language suggests a more expansive interpretation of Tashjlian.
71. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added). This quote was included in the
Republican Party's Post-Trial Brief appealing the District Court's ruling in California
Democratic Party. See Post-Trial Brief at 7, California Democratic Party (No. CIV-S-
96-2038 DFL).
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Yet the fact that a state election regulation places a severe burden on
a party's First Amendment rights is not the end of the inquiry. Under the
Anderson test, the Court must next examine the state's asserted interest
in regulating primaries.72
B. Possible State Justi fications for Blanket Primary Laws
California offered the following four essential state interests 73 in
support of its newly adopted blanket primary law: (1) increasing compe-
tition among the candidates; (2) producing elected officials who best rep-
resent the electorate; (3) increasing voter participation by opening the
candidate selection process to include both independent and minor party
voters; and (4) preserving the integrity of the electoral process. 74 Each of
these interests will be examined in turn.
1. Increasing Competition Among the Candidates
One argument California advanced in defense of its blanket primary
law was that the voting system "encourages healthy competition." 75 The
premise of this argument is that by giving voters greater choice among
candidates in a primary election, the candidates will be forced to compete
more aggressively for each available vote. Proponents of this argument
suggest that this increased competition will lead to greater and more sub-
stantial political debates, thereby fostering the democratic process.76
72. See Anderson 460 U.S. at 789.
73. California actually advanced more than four interests in support of the blanket
primary law, but Judge Levi found that most of California's interest could be reduced to
the assertion that blanket primaries "enhanceol the democratic nature of the election proc-
ess and representativeness of elected officials." California Democratic Party, 984 F.
Supp. at 1301. Judge Levi's opinion focused on the following arguments asserted by
California: (1) the contention that blanket primaries will increase voter participation by
opening the candidate selection process to minor party and independent voters; (2) the
notion that blanket primaries will produce officials who best represent the electorate; and
(3) the idea that blanket primaries will ultimately increase voter participation in general.
See id. at 1301.
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This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, a number of cases
addressing the constitutionality of election regulations have considered
and rejected the theory that the First Amendment rights of some should
be limited for the benefit of the democratic process. For example, in
Buckley v. Valeo,77 the Supreme Court struck down a federal law re-
stricting campaign contributions and expenditures. According to Buck-
ley, the notion that the government may restrict the First Amendment
rights of one segment of the population in order to increase the relative
voice of others is "wholly foreign to the First Amendment.""8 Yet Cali-
fornia's attempt to justify a blanket primary law on the grounds that it
increases competition is vulnerable to the same analysis-California is
essentially arguing that the state should restrict the First Amendment
rights of political parties in order to obtain the systemic benefits that flow
from increased competition among the candidates.79
The notion that increased competition is a compelling state interest
was also rejected in Bates v. Jones,80 a district court case which ad-
dressed the constitutionality of term limits for state elected officials. Ac-
cording to the Bates court, increased competition is not a compelling
state interest because it is not clear that it will produce a better democ-
racy:
[as] used by the State, the term "electoral competition" refers to
increasing the number of candidates running for office and de-
creasing the margins by which candidates win elections. Neither
of these interests, by themselves, are compelling interests be-
cause it is not self-evident that they have a desirable effect on
government. 1
In other words, even if blanket primary laws do increase competition,
this alone is not a compelling state interest because it is not clear that
candidate competition benefits the state.
Thus, courts have considered and rejected the notion that increased
competition is a compelling state interest. But the "increased competi-
77. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
78. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (rejecting argument that term limits level
playing field as compelling state interest).
79. This author expresses no opinion about the merits of the Buckley decision.
80. 958 F. Supp. 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
81. Id. at 1468.
[Vol. 44
CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY V. JONES
tion" argument also fails for a second reason. Even assuming that in-
creased competition is a compelling state interest, California must still
demonstrate a nexus between the blanket primary system and increased
competition. The mere assertion that increased competition will result
from the institution of a blanket primary is not sufficient in light of the
severe burden that the system places on a party's First Amendment
rights. In the absence of empirical evidence of a nexus, the Supreme
Court should reject the argument that blanket primaries increase compe-
tition among candidates.
2. Producing Elected Officials Who Best Represent the Electorate
Proponents of state-mandated blanket primaries also contend that a
blanket primary system will lead to the election of more centrist officials
who are more representative of their districts. For example, California
asserts that officials elected via a blanket primary system "stand closer to
the median" in their districts than officials elected through a closed pri-
mary system.8 2 California further asserts that a blanket primary system
will result in elected officials who more accurately reflect the political
views of all of the voters they represent.83
Like the argument that blanket primaries increase competition, this
argument too is flawed. The notion that the state has an interest in sup-
porting the election of candidates who stand closer to the median is tan-
tamount to asserting that the state has an interest in supporting the elec-
tion of candidates with certain ideologies. A state clearly does not have a
legitimate, let alone compelling, interest in promoting the election of
more moderate candidates. Favoring any election system because of the
content or viewpoint of the speech that may result from those officials
who are elected is not a proper government interest.
84
Supporters of this viewpoint often attempt to cloak this argument in
language which suggests that the state is merely supporting a system that
82. Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 51, California Democratic Party (No. 97-
17440); see also Elisabeth R. Gerber and Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems
and Representation, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 304, 304 (1998) (arguing that open primary
systems lead to election of more moderate candidates).
83. See Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 5 1, California Democratic Party (No.
97-17440).
84. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (discussing
concern that government's content discrimination may drive certain viewpoints from the
"marketplace" of ideas).
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ensures that the "election winner will represent a majority of the com-
munity.',85 But this argument confuses the function of the primary elec-
tion with the function of the general election. It is the candidate who
wins the general election that is charged with the responsibility of repre-
senting the district as a whole. The primary election winner is charged
only with the responsibility of representing the ideals and beliefs of his
or her party.86
3. Increasing Participation by Opening the Primary Process to In-
dependent and Minor Party Voters
Perhaps the most persuasive justification for state-mandated blanket
primaries is the notion that the system will further democratize elections
by opening the primary process to both minor party and independent vot-
ers. Proponents argue that these two growing groups are effectively dis-
enfranchised in a closed primary system.87 Especially in so-called "safe
districts," in which one party is clearly dominant, many think that inde-
pendent and minor party voters would be more involved and better repre-
sented through a blanket primary system.88
For example, in a Democratic safe district where Democrats repre-
sent at least sixty percent of registered voters, the Democratic candidate
will almost always win the general election. In such districts, the critical
election becomes the primary rather than the general. 89 Therefore, many
85. California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1303.
86. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 125-26 (discussing importance of primary elec-
tions in formation of political parties' ideologies).
87. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1301-02 (discussing argu-
ment that blanket primary opens primary process to include "disenfranchised" voters);
Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 53, California Democratic Party (No. 97-17440)
(arguing that California's closed primary disenfranchises one-quarter million minor party
and independent voters).
88. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1302 (defining safe districts
and discussing notion that minor party voters in safe districts have little voice in elec-
tions); see also Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 53, California Democratic Party
(No. 97-17440) (explaining safe districts and arguing that disenfranchised voters in safe
districts have "no say in the overall election"). According to California's Brief to the
Ninth Circuit in California Democratic Party, a majority of congressional, state senate,
and assembly districts in California are "safe" for one major party or the other. See id.
89. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1302 (explaining impact of
general election in safe districts).
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argue that voters who are unable to participate in the Democratic primary
are effectively disenfranchised.90
This argument is not without force. Perhaps if states adopt a blanket
primary system, voter participation in primary elections would increase
as a result of the participation of minor party and independent voters -
so called "unaffiliated voters." Moreover, a blanket primary would
clearly allow unaffiliated voters to participate in and influence the out-
come of the major party primaries in safe districts.
Nonetheless, this argument is not persuasive. Political parties have a
constitutional right to freedom of association, a right that includes the
ability of each party to define its own boundaries and select its own
nominees. 91 As long as the state provides unaffiliated voters with alter-
native methods of nominating general election candidates, unaffiliated
voters do not have a constitutional right to participate in other parties'
primary elections.92 As one author explained, "[t]he party member's con-
stitutional right takes precedence over unaffiliated voters' non-
constitutional interest in primary outcomes. 93
In addition, even assuming that states have an interest in increasing
the influence of unaffiliated voters more generally, instituting a blanket
primary is not the least restrictive means of accomplishing this goal. For
example, states could relax the requirements for obtaining access to the
general election ballot so that any candidate who can demonstrate some
minimal level of support could appear on the general election ballot.94
This would increase the likelihood that unaffiliated voters would find a
candidate in the general election who represents their political beliefs.
Finally, to the extent that the state has an interest in increasing voter
participation in general, there are more effective and more narrowly tai-
lored means of doing so than instituting a blanket primary. States that do
not currently have "same day registration" could implement such a sys-
tem.95 In addition, every state could move election day to Sunday, make
90. See id.
91. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at215.
92. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 133-34 n.10 (discussing constitutional rights of
unaffiliated voters).
93. Id. at 133.
94. See id. at 134.
95. It is interesting to note that under a same day registration system, the differ-
ences between the three primary systems are arguably de minimus. Because voters can
decide the day of the election which party they chose to affiliate with and thus which
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election day a holiday, or allow polls to remain open for two or three
days.96 All of these changes would likely increase voter turnout without
infringing the constitutional rights of political parties.
4. Preserving the Integrity of the Electoral Process
The final argument advanced in support of blanket primary laws is
the notion that blanket primaries somehow strengthen the integrity of the
electoral process.97 Supporters maintain that a blanket primary is more
likely than a closed primary to lead the public to believe that primary
elections are an open and fair process.98 However, this argument is also
flawed. Rather than preserving the integrity of elections, a blanket pri-
mary may actually diminish the integrity of the electoral process. Pre-
serving the integrity of the electoral process presumably includes insur-
ing that voters have confidence in the state's election system. However,
as a result of a conflict with the Republican and Democratic National
Parties' rules, California's decision to adopt a blanket primary may shake
this confidence.
Both the Democratic and Republican parties have national party
rules that forbid non-party members from participating in the selection of
each party's national convention delegates.99 The delegates officially
nominate and select each party's nominee at the national nominating
ballot to request at the polls, there is little difference between an open primary and a
closed primary in a state that allows same day registration.
96. Many of these alternatives were suggested by the California Republican Party
in their Post-Trial Brief in California Democratic Party. See Post-Trial Brief at 27-28,
California Democratic Party (No. CIV. S-96-2038 DFL).
97. Although California did not explicitly utilize this justification in defending its
blanket primary system, all of the interests advanced by the state relate to the integrity of
the electoral process as a whole.
98. See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 4, at 131-32 (discussing notion that preserving
integrity of general elections justifies state decision to adopt one primary system as op-
posed to another).
99. See Ballot Material for Proposition 3-November 3, 1998 General Election
(discussing parties' rules preventing delegates selected by unaffiliated voters from being
seated); Mark Z. Barabak, Seeking a Presidential Loophole in Blanket Primary Law, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 1998, at AlO (discussing national party rules and California's various
attempts to ensure that California's votes count in presidential primary); see also La Fol-
lette, 450 U.S. at 109 (explaining National Democratic Party rules and holding that par-
ties have constitutional right to refuse to seat delegates selected by unaffiliated voters).
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convention.100 Thus, the National Republican Party will not permit non-
Republicans to participate in selecting the Republican national conven-
tion delegates, and the Democratic National Party will not permit non-
Democrats to participate in selecting the Democratic national convention
delegates. Yet under a blanket primary system, that is precisely what
occurs - state law requires both major parties to permit unaffiliated vot-
ers to participate in their parties' presidential primary elections. 101 The
Supreme Court has held that the national parties have the right to refuse
to seat delegates from a state that permits nonaffiliates to vote in the par-
ties' presidential primaries.102 For example, the National Democratic
Party has the constitutional right to refuse to seat the delegates elected by
California voters in the March 7, 2000 presidential primary.
Soon after California's blanket primary law was adopted, state offi-
cials realized that the new law could prevent California voters from par-
ticipating in selecting the Democratic and Republican presidential nomi-
nees. Accordingly, lawmakers quickly explored various means of en-
suring that the national parties would accept California's votes, while at
the same time preserving the new blanket primary law approved by the
voters. 1°4
One solution to the conflict is to allow the blanket primary to pro-
ceed, but to select the actual delegates through a party caucus rather than
through the election. 0 5 This solution was adopted by the State of Wash-
ington, one of the three other states with a state-mandated blanket pri-
100. For example, by selecting Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential primary, vot-
ers actually selected a slate of delegates pledged to vote for Clinton at the National
Democratic Convention. Each candidate on the presidential primary ballot has a unique
list of pledged delegates. The pledged delegation that receives the most votes goes to the
nominating convention on behalf of the state. Together with the pledged delegations from
other states, the delegates will select the party's presidential nominee. See Argument in
Favor of Proposition 3-November 3, 1998 General Election (explaining presidential
nominating process).
101. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1291-92 (explaining blan-
ket primary system).
102. See LaFollette Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 127 (holding that National
Democratic Party need not seat Wisconsin delegates selected through open primary).
103. See Dave F. Pike, High Court to Rule on State's Open Primaries, L.A. DAILY
J., Jan. 24, 2000 at 1.
104. See id.
105. See generally John Marelius, Open Primary May Stir State Problem in 2000
at http://vww.uniontrib.com ( Feb. 8, 1999) (discussing party caucuses as an alternative
method of selecting delegates).
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mary.1°6 In Washington State, for the year 2000 presidential primary,
voters will go to the polls and vote in a blanket primary election. How-
ever, the election will be little more than a "beauty contest" because the
results of the election will not lead to the selection of delegates. 10 7 In-
stead, each party will hold a caucus to select delegates to send to its re-
spective national party convention. The party caucuses rather than the
voters will decide which Democratic and Republican presidential candi-
dates will receive Washington State's electoral votes in the year 2000
presidential primary.
The use of party caucuses to resolve the conflict between blanket
primaries and the major parties' national rules may lead many voters to
question the integrity of the electoral process. Under the Washington
State system, voters participate in an election that is arguably meaning-
less, while only a small percentage of the state's population is able to
participate in the more meaningful party caucuses. Because the caucus
rather than the electorate decides which nominee will receive Washing-
ton State's votes, the average voter will not have any voice in selecting
the major parties' presidential nominees.
California has adopted a different resolution to this conflict. The
California Legislature adopted a law that brings the state into compliance
with the national parties' rules in time for the year 2000 primary! 05 The
law allows California to conduct a blanket primary and provide the na-
tional parties with vote tabulations that do not include the votes of nonaf-
flliates. 10 9 Specifically, the Legislature amended the blanket primary law
to permit two tallies of the votes for President - one for the blanket
primary beauty contest and a second for the parties' delegate selection
process." 0 For this second tabulation, computers will count only regis-
tered Democrats' votes for the Democratic candidates and registered Re-
106. See Brief of Amici Curiae State of Washington and State of Alaska at 1,
California Democratic Party (No. 97-17440).
107. See John Marelius, Open Primary May Stir State Problem in 2000 at
http://www.uniontrib.com, (Feb. 8, 1999) (referring to such elections as "beauty con-
tests").
108. See Pike, supra note 103, at I (discussing amendment to California's blanket
primary initiative); see also Mark Z. Barabak, Seeking a Presidential Loophole in Blanket
Primary Law, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1998, at A10.
109. See Dave F. Pike, High Court to Rule on State's Open Primaries, L.A. DAILY
J., Jan. 24, 2000 (discussing amendment to California's blanket primary initiative).
110. See id.
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publicans' votes for the Republican candidates."' Although the state will
presumably announce the results of both tabulations, the parties are free
to use the second tally at their national conventions. 2
Under this system, the integrity of the electoral process still suffers.
Presumably California will have to explain to voters that because they
adopted a blanket primary system, they will be permitted to vote in a
non-binding beauty contest' 1 3 California will also have to explain to vot-
ers that although they are allowed to vote for any candidate for President,
if they chose to vote outside their party, their vote will not be counted in
the second delegate selection tally. As a result of this system, voters may
not understand how to effectively cast their votes in the presidential pri-
mary, and thus may question the fairness of the electoral process.
Thus, rather than increasing the integrity of elections, a blanket pri-
mary system, in conjunction with the long-standing rules of both of the
major parties, may seriously jeopardize the integrity of the electoral pro-
cess. Accordingly, preserving the integrity of elections and the electoral
process cannot serve as a compelling state interest that justifies the use of
a state-mandated blanket primary.
C. Conclusion: State-Mandated Blanket Primaries
Are Unconstitutional
Under the Anderson test, the Supreme Court should find state-
mandated blanket primaries unconstitutional. The blanket primary inter-
feres with a political party's ability to define its own boundaries and se-
lect its own nominees. Moreover, the process of selecting a nominee
may profoundly affect not just a party's choice of candidates, but also the
content of the party's political speech. The blanket primary severely
burdens a party's First Amendment right to freedom of association as
defined by the Supreme Court in Tashjian.
Furthermore, this severe burden cannot be supported by a compelling
state interest. None of the interests advanced by California truly justifies
this burden. First, courts have rejected the notion that increasing compe-
tition among candidates can serve as a compelling state interest. Second,
even if blanket primaries do lead to more moderate elected officials,
111. See S.B. 28, 1999 Cal. Sess., located at http:flwww.sen.ca.gov.
112. See id.
113. See John Marelius, Open Primary May Stir State Problem in 2000 at
http://www.uniontrib.com (Feb. 8, 1999) (discussing proposed bills).
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states do not have a legitimate, let alone compelling, state interest in
promoting the election of candidates with certain ideologies. Third, the
constitutional rights of political parties take precedence over the non-
constitutional rights of unaffiliated voters to participate in party prima-
ries. Finally, rather than preserving the integrity of elections, blanket
primaries may actually diminish their integrity.
The final prong of the Anderson test requires the Supreme Court to
weigh the burden on a party's First Amendment rights against Califor-
nia's asserted justifications. On balance, the state's asserted govern-
mental interests cannot justify the severe burden blanket primary laws
impose on a party's First Amendment rights. Accordingly, under exist-
ing Supreme Court precedent, the Supreme Court should find Califor-
nia's blanket primary law unconstitutional.
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE CONCLUSION
THAT STATE-MANDATED BLANKET PRIMARIES ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Although Supreme Court precedent supports the notion that state-
mandated blanket primaries are unconstitutional, this holding also raises
a number of questions that the Supreme Court may be reluctant to ad-
dress. First, some scholars have suggested that such a holding would be
inconsistent with the White Primary Cases, which held that parties can-
not discriminate on the basis of race in elections because in the election
context, political parties are agents of the state.114 Part A of this section
will explore the potential conflict between striking down blanket primary
laws due to their impact on parties as private associations and the notion
that parties are state actors in the context of the White Primary Cases.
Second, although Supreme Court precedent suggests that state-
mandated blanket primaries are unconstitutional, that precedent arguably
requires the Court to find that all state-mandated primary systems are
unconstitutional. Under existing Supreme Court precedent, only a pri-
mary system selected by the parties would pass constitutional muster.
Part B will examine some of the difficulties associated with this conclu-
sion.
114. See, e.g., Carman, supra note 10, at 668-69 (discussing White Primary Cases
and potential conflict between this line of cases and those cases that discuss political
parties' rights to freedom of association); see also Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1747-53
(discussing potential conflict between two lines of authority).
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Finally, Part C will explore the related question of who must speak
before a court can conclude that "the party" has spoken. If the only con-
stitutional primary system is one selected by the parties, then courts may
need to confront the difficult issue of who speaks on behalf of a party.
A. Consistency with the White Primary Cases
The premise underlying the idea that political parties have First
Amendment associational rights is that political parties are private asso-
ciations.1 5 Indeed, political parties do exhibit many of the attributes of a
typical private association. Yet as Laurence Tribe explains, political
parties also "seem imbued with a quasi-governmental character."' 1 6 It is
this hybrid nature of political parties that has led some scholars to ques-
tion whether the parties' claim for privacy and autonomy can be recon-
ciled with the notion that political parties can also be state actors.
The leading line of authority holding that parties may be state actors
is the so-called "White Primary Cases." In these cases, the Supreme
Court invalidated various attempts by the Democratic party to disenfran-
chise African-Americans. 17 For example, the Court struck down Demo-
cratic party rules that prohibited African-Americans from participating in
pre-primary party meetings." 8 The Supreme Court held that these rules
violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 19 However, the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments do not regulate private conduct;
they only proscribe government behavior.120 Thus, in order to hold that
political parties cannot discriminate on the basis of race, the Court had to
find that the party's actions were state actions.
12 1
115. See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1118 (discussing political parties and state action
doctrine).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 1118-19 (discussing White Primary Cases).
118. See generally Terry v. Adams, 344 U.S. 883 (1952); see also Tribe, supra
note 2, at 1119 (discussing White Primary Cases).
119. See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1118-19 (discussing political parties and state ac-
tion doctrine).
120. See id. at 1118 (discussing political parties and state action doctrine).
121. See Tribe, supra note 2, at 1118-20 (discussing state action doctrine and
White Primary Cases). This is not to suggest that the Court found state action because it
wanted to hold the party's actions unconstitutional, but rather that state action is a neces-
sary precondition to such a holding. Still, some authors suggest that state action is just a
post hoe label the Court applies to justify striking down regulations in certain situations.
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Although the Supreme Court concluded that the Democratic party's
actions were equivalent to actions of the state, the Court failed to articu-
late the legal basis for finding state action in this context. Scholars such
as Tribe argue that the Court found state action in the White Primary
Cases because the state affords preferential ballot access in the general
election to the winner of the Democratic party primary. 22 Under this
view, a party's action is a state action "when the state incorporates the
party's behavior by automatically placing the primary winners on the
general election ballot.',
2 3
Regardless of the rationale, in striking down the Democratic party
rules at issue in the White Primary Cases, the Supreme Court held that in
certain circumstances, "activities of political parties are reviewable as
actions of the state.' 124 However, in order to claim the protections of the
First Amendment and enjoy the right to freedom of association, political
parties must be private associations, not government actors.' Thus,
some scholars suggest that by striking down blanket primary laws as a
violation of the parties' right to freedom of association, the Supreme
Court may threaten the legal underpinnings of the White Primary
Cases. 26 As one author explains:
Thus, by declaring parties to be "public," the White Primary
Cases not only prohibited [the parties] from depriving racial mi-
norities of the right to vote but also seemed to deprive the parties
of the protections of the Bill of Rights. If instead parties were
declared to be "private," they would enjoy constitutional rights,
See Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1753 (describing state action as a post hoc label rather
than an "a priori analytic device").
122. See Tribe, supra note 2, at 1121 (explaining that state incorporates behavior
of parties into general election ballot is most persuasive description of state action doc-
trine in election context). Although Tribe supports this explanation of the state action
doctrine as applied to political parties, the Supreme Court has yet to explicitly endorse
this theory. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 119 n.10 (discussing state action and White
Primary Cases).
123. Guttman, supra note 4, at 119 n.10
124. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1120.
125. See id.
126. See Carman, supra note 10, at 668-69 (discussing potential conflict between
White Primary Cases and notion that parties have rights to freedom of association);
Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1748-49 (discussing potential conflict between White Pri-
mary Cases and notion that parties have rights to freedom of association).
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but the foundation for the White Primary Cases would be under-
cut.
127
Under this view, the notion that state-mandated blanket primary laws are
unconstitutional undercuts the legal foundation for the White Primary
Cases.
This conflict, however, is more apparent than real. The equal pro-
tection context of the White Primary Cases is distinguishable from the
First Amendment context of a blanket primary law. In the context of
equal protection, discrimination on the basis of race is different than dis-
criminating between affiliated and non-affiliated members of a political
party. Excluding voters from a primary election on the basis of race
amounts to invidious discrimination and is subject to strict scrutiny.128 In
contrast, a law that discriminates against non-affiliates is not invidious
and would only be subject to rational basis review because voters can
change their party affiliations any time they please. 129 Thus, it is consis-
tent with constitutional doctrine that a court would allow a party to "dis-
criminate" against voters on the basis of affiliation while condemning
discrimination on the basis of race.
It is important to note, however, that there are certain contexts in
which the state cannot discriminate against individuals based on party
affiliation. 130 For example, the state cannot consider political beliefs or
party affiliation when making hiring, firing, or promotional decisions
regarding its employees.13' However, a court's decision to strike down a
blanket primary law does not raise such problems. The state can consti-
tutionally deny non-affiliates the right to vote in a party primary as long
as the state provides non-affiliates with alternative avenues for placing a
candidate on the general election ballot. 132 In other words, the state does
not abridge a voter's constitutional right to vote by allowing the parties
to limit participation in their respective primaries to only affiliates, pro-
127. Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1748-49.
128. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 137 nn.9 & 13 (distinguishing White Primary
Cases).
129. See id.
130. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64 (1990).
131. See id.
132. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 137 n.10 (discussing state action and White
Primary Cases).
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vided every voter has an opportunity to participate in placing candidates
on the general election ballot.1
33
Thus, the White Primary Cases can be reconciled with the conclusion
that state-mandated blanket primary laws are unconstitutional. Discrimi-
nation on the basis of race is suspect, while discrimination on the basis of
party affiliation is not.134 Moreover, the Supreme Court may strike down
a party policy permitting racial discrimination, and at the same time, up-
hold a party rule that permits discrimination on the basis of party affilia-
tion. As long as the state provides voters with an alternative avenue for
placing candidates on the general election ballot, prohibiting non-
affiliates from voting in a party's primary does not violate the non-
affiliates' constitutional rights.
B. Must Courts Find All State-Mandated Primary
Election Systems Unconstitutional
Although the first issue raised by the notion that state-mandated
blanket primaries are unconstitutional is easily resolved, this second is-
sue is more problematic. As discussed above, the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Tashjian supports the conclusion that state-mandated blanket pri-
maries are unconstitutional. However, Tashjian arguably supports the
notion that all state-mandated primaries are unconstitutional. If this is in
fact the case, only a primary system selected by the parties would pass
constitutional scrutiny.
In Tashjian, the Republican party challenged a Connecticut closed
primary law that forbid the party from opening its candidate selection
process to non-affiliates. 136 In striking down the law, the Supreme Court
issued a broad statement regarding the right of political parties to deter-
mine their own boundaries: "the freedom to join together in furtherance
of common political beliefs 'necessarily presupposes the freedom to
identify the people who constitute the association."" 137 The Court ulti-
mately held that Connecticut's closed primary law infringed the Republi-




136. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 211-12 (discussing closed primary statute at issue
in Tashjian).
137. Id. at 214.
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determining "with whom they will associate, [and] whose support they
will seek.,
131
It is this broad language in Tashjian that requires the Supreme Court
to find state-mandated blanket primaries unconstitutional. Although a
closed primary limits who may participate in a party primary and a blan-
ket primary requires parties to allow non-affiliates to participate, the con-
stitutional right at issue is the same-the right of a political party to de-
termine its own boundaries. Under Tashjian, a party should have the
right to decide not to include non-affiliates, just as it has the right to in-
vite non-affiliates to participate in its primary.
But such a strict reading of Tashjian would presumably mean that all
state-mandated primary systems are unconstitutional. If political parties
have the absolute right to define their own boundaries, then regardless of
whether the state employs an open, closed, or blanket primary, if a party
prefers one of the other tvo alternatives, it can challenge the current
system on First Amendment grounds. For example, suppose California's
blanket primary law is struck down as unconstitutional and California
maintains its previous closed primary system. Next year, the California
Republican Party, like the Connecticut Republican Party, may decide to
open its primary election to unaffiliated voters. In this case, the Republi-
can party could challenge California's closed primary statute just as it is
currently challenging California's blanket primary statute.
In his decision upholding California's blanket primary law, Judge
Levi recognized this potential reading of Tashjian.139 As Judge Levi ex-
plained, if political parties had the absolute right to define their own
boundaries, "then open primaries would also be unconstitutional upon
any party's objection: an open primary, every bit as much as a blanket
primary, permits voters who are not registered in a party to vote in that
party's primary." 140 Levi recognized that the issue is not the primary
election system a state chooses, but rather, whether the parties them-
selves would select the same system.
Moreover, it is possible that the various political parties may not se-
lect the same primary system. If the Republican party invites unaffiliated
voters to participate in its primary, while the Democratic party exercises
138. Id.
139. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1294-95 (discussing logical
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its right to exclude non-affiliates, does the Constitution require the state
to accommodate both parties' preferences? Under Tashjian, the answer is
not clear.
Thus, Tashjian leaves both courts and scholars in an difficult place.
Tashjian suggests that state-mandated blanket primaries are unconstitu-
tional. However, it also suggests that all state-mandated primary systems
are unconstitutional. It is not clear whether states will be able to modify
their primary systems to accommodate the changing whims of the vari-
ous parties, or even whether the states should be constitutionally required
to do so. If the logical conclusion of Tashjian results in an unworkable
model, perhaps the Tashjian framework for analyzing the relationship
between the state and political parties should be reconsidered.
C. Who Speaks for "The Party"?
The final question prompted by the conclusion that blanket primary
laws are unconstitutional involves the difficult question of who is
authorized to speak on behalf of a given political party. If the only con-
stitutional primary election system is one selected by the parties, courts
must be able to determine when a party supports a particular voting sys-
tem. For example, if the California Democratic State Central Committee
decides that the Democratic party supports a blanket primary, is it appro-
priate for a court to find that "the party" supports such a system? Simi-
larly, if a majority of registered Democrats supported Proposition 198,
the initiative that instituted a blanket primary system in California, could
a court confidently conclude that "the party" has spoken? Although few,
if any, court decisions have addressed these questions to date, courts and
scholars may soon have to struggle to provide answers.
Judge Levi's opinion in California Democratic Party is one of the
few opinions to have recognized and addressed some of the difficulties in
determining who speaks for a party. In California Democratic Party,
Judge Levi upheld the California blanket primary initiative as constitu-
tional in the face of challenges by both major parties and two minor par-
ties.141 Levi's opinion was later affirmed and adopted by the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.142
141. See id. at 1303.
142. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 1999).
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In California Democratic Party, California argued that because exit
polls demonstrated that a majority of both Democrats and Republicans
favored the initiative, "the parties" supported the blanket primary.' 43 Ac-
cording to the State, these polls proved that the rank-and-file members of
both parties approved of a blanket primary system, and the court should
defer to the interests of the members over the interests of Democratic and
Republican party leaders. 144 Thus, the State argued that the court should
recognize the rank-and-file members, rather than the leadership, as the
voice of a party.
Judge Levi did not agree, however. In a lengthy footnote Levi dis-
missed the State's argument.1 45 According to Levi, there are three rea-
sons why California's argument is flawed. 46 Levi's first two reasons are
essentially procedural. First, the Los Angeles Times poll at issue did not
report the votes of minor party candidates. 47 Thus, even if California's
argument was theoretically correct, it would not affect the minor parties'
complaint regarding the blanket primary initiative because there is no
evidence as to the views of their rank-and-file members. Second, Levi
questioned California's suggestion that exit polls could be used in place
of actual vote tabulations. 148 As Levi stated, "In no other context do we
accept the results of polling for the act of voting."'
49
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Levi dismissed the argument
on its merits-he disagreed with California's contention that rank-and-
file members are empowered to speak for a party.150 As Judge Levi
stated:
143. See Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 10-16, California Democratic Party,
984 F.Supp 1288 (E.D. Cal 1997) (No. CIV. S-96-2038 DFL) (arguing that Proposition
198 presents no First Amendment issue because, according to exit polls, rank-and-file
Democrats and Republicans supported initiative).
144. See id. According to the Los Angeles Times exit poll, 61% of Democrats sup-
ported Proposition 198, as did 57% of Republicans. See id. at 10.
145. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1294 n.16 (discussing
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Finally, the parties have certain procedures for the modification
of their rules. These procedures require deliberation and deci-
sionmaking by the parties' respective central committees. Other
deliberative bodies have similar procedural rules. Such rules
may affect the nature of debate-indeed, may cause there to be
debate-and may affect the outcome of the decision. We would
not accept a poll of legislators as the equivalent of a legislative
vote. For much the same reason, a poll of voters is not the
equivalent of a decision by a party according to the procedural
rules of the party. The court therefore rejects the argument that
the "parties," as defined by the electorate, have agreed to Propo-
sition 198 .... 1"1
Thus, Judge Levi categorically rejected California's argument that the
rank-and-file may speak for the party. According to Levi, in order for a
court to conclude that "the party" has spoken, the party and its leadership
must arrive at a decision by following the party's internal decisionmak-
ing procedures.
Perhaps other courts will follow Judge Levi's lead and conclude that
the rank-and-file cannot speak for the party outside of the party's own
governance structure. Furthermore, although Levi's view as expressed in
California Democratic Party is arguably dicta, courts may soon be
forced to confront this issue more directly. As long as Tashjian requires
courts to evaluate First Amendment challenges to state election regula-
tions by focusing on the importance a party's ability to define its own
boundaries, courts will continue to confront the difficult issue of who
speaks for the party.
V. CONCLUSION
Current Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Court should find
California's blanket primary law unconstitutional. Yet this conclusion
leaves courts and scholars in an unsettling place, for it raises a number of
seemingly difficult issues. Although the legal underpinnings of the
White Primary Cases are not threatened by the notion that state-
mandated blanket primary laws are unconstitutional, the remaining two
issues discussed in this Article cannot be so easily resolved. To date, the
Supreme Court has not been forced to squarely address the question of
151. Id.
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whether political parties have the First Amendment right to select their
own primary election system, or the question of who is authorized to
speak for a party. Perhaps when faced with these questions, the Court
will be forced to rethink the Tashjian model and redefine the unique and
evolving relationship between the state and political parties.

